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HELPING NONPROFITS POLICE THEMSELVES: WHAT TRUST
LAW CAN TEACH US ABOUT CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
MELANIE B. LESLIE 1
INTRODUCTION

Over the past decade, scandals involving nonprofit boards and conflicts of interest have been the subject of considerable public attention. The
resulting bad publicity, Congressional hearings, and calls for reform have
failed to mitigate the problem. In 2009 alone the country witnessed several
spectacular examples of self-dealing by nonprofit directors. For example,
The Boston Globe recently reported that Suffolk University has a $10,000
per month contract with Wolfblock Public Strategies, lobbyist Robert
Crowe's firm. Robert Crowe is also a Suffolk University trustee, and a
member of the compensation committee that made University President
David Sargent the highest-paid University President in 2006. When two
Boston Globe reporters questioned Crowe about the apparent conflict-ofinterest, he replied, "[t]o even insinuate there is a conflict is wrong. There
is no conflict ...[w]hether or not my public strategy group is paid $10,000
is not relevant. We don't make money on that. We are providing a service
'2
to Suffolk."
Ezra Merkin, the chair of Yeshiva University's investment committee,
invested millions of dollars of Yeshiva University's endowment with Ascot
Partners, a hedge fund he controlled. 3 His 1.5% management fee was arguably higher than Yeshiva could have obtained from an arms-length
transaction. Worse, Yeshiva's board allegedly did not require Merkin to
disclose his investment strategy as a condition to taking the money. The

1. Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. I would like to thank Dana Brakeman
Reiser, Evelyn Brody, Ray Madoff, Harvey Dale and Stewart E. Sterk for helpful comments and criticism. Special thanks to my wonderful research assistants, Scott Danner and Eytan Goldschein.
2. Frank Phillips & Peter Schworm, Trustees' fiscal ties roil Suffolk Conflict-of-interest policy
scrutinized, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 26, 2008, at B 1. According to Crowe, his firm's annual $120,000
rate is "half what other lobbying companies would charge." Yet Suffolk University failed to disclose
the Wolfblock contract-and several other contracts between Suffolk Trustees and the University-to
the Massachussetts attorney general's office, in violation of Massachusetts law. Id.
3. Jason Zweig, The Intelligent Investor: Where Ezra Merkin Lost His Way, WALL ST. J., Jan. 10,
2009, at B1.
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New York State Attorney General alleges that Merkin then quietly en4
trusted the funds to Bernard Madoff.

In April of 2009, a local newspaper reported that Hackensack University Medical Center's board routinely engaged in major transactions with
board members, often without the advance approval of the full board. In
response to the newspaper article, the hospital hired two major law firms to
"review its governance policies."' 5
The point of this article is not to argue that most board members are
bad actors intent on abusing their fiduciary positions for private gain. In
fact, directors who sanction problematic conflict-of-interest transactions are
often acting in good faith. 6 They believe that transactions with board members are in the nonprofit's best interests, even when they are not, and-like
Robert Crowe-often fail to perceive the conflict entirely.
Yet scandals like those cited above damage the credibility of the nonprofit sector. They create the false impression that most nonprofit boards
routinely siphon corporate assets away from mission and into board members' pockets. They lead to public calls for greater government regulation
of the industry in the form of increased reporting requirements and mandated governance structures. Scholars have argued persuasively that in4. David Segal & Alison Leigh Cowan, Madoffs Shared Much; Question is How Much, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 15, 2009, at Al.

5. Mary Jo Layton, Firms Hired to Review Hospital'sPolicies; Hackensack's Move in Wake of
Influence Peddling Conviction, THE RECORD (Bergen County, N.J.), April 30, 2009, at L3; Mary Jo
Layton, Hospital's Influence Reaches Far; Tangled Web of Power, THE RECORD (Bergen County,
N.J.), April 26, 2009, at Al. The Hospital's transactions with board members included: the hospital's
payment of $475,000 to a board member for construction services; the hospital's payment of more than
$2 million to Progenitor Cell Therapy, a private stem cell research company owned in part by a board
members and the hospital's chief operating officer; the hospital's payment of $2.5 million to lease space
from a company owned and managed by a board member's cousin; and the hospital's payment of more
than $1 million in fees to a law firm in which a board member was a partner. Id.
6. In a 2007 study conducted by the Urban Institute's Center on Nonprofits and Philanthropy,
more than twenty percent of nonprofits surveyed reported engaging in financial transactions with board
members in the preceding two years, and that many of those deals are not below market. FRANCINE
OSTROWER, NONPROFIT GOVERNANCE IN THE UNITED STATES: FINDINGS ON PERFORMANCE AND
ACCOUNTABILITY FROM THE FIRST NATIONAL REPRESENTATIVE STUDY, THE URBAN INSTITUTE,

CENTER ON NONPROFITS AND PHILANTHROPY 8-9 (2007). The bigger the charity, the more likely it was

to have engaged in a transaction with a board member: among those nonprofits with at least $10 million
in annual expenses, forty-one percent reported transacting with board members in the past two years. Of
course, if all of these conflicted transactions were for goods and services at well below market rates,
then self-dealing would not result in diversion of nonprofit assets and there would be no reason for
concern. But seventy-four percent of charities that admit to engaging in conflicted transactions state that
they engage in transactions at "market value," while only fifty-one percent also reported that they
obtained some goods and services at below market costs. Oddly, charity size is correlated to the frequency of self-dealing at-market transactions, but not in the direction one might expect: fifty-eight
percent of the smallest nonprofits (those with operating expenses less than $100,000 per year) report
that they received goods and services at below market prices, but eighty-five percent of charities with
more than $40 million in annual expenses reported engaging in conflicted transactions for market value,
while only twenty-four percent of these charities also reported engaging in below-market deals.
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creased regulatory demands would create untenable costs for nonprofits,
especially smaller ones, and would be of questionable effectiveness. 7 Yet
unless the scandals stop breaking, it seems unlikely that the drive toward
increased regulation will abate.
This article argues that there is a better way to reduce the amount of
damaging self-dealing in the nonprofit sector: reform the law addressing
self-dealing and conflicts of interest to enable nonprofits to do a better job
of policing themselves. Much of the blame for these reoccurring scandals
rests squarely with the law. Both state fiduciary duty law and the selfdealing provisions of the federal tax code employ fuzzy standards that give
little guidance to boards who might be considering transacting with a board
member. The law specifies no procedure for ensuring that such transactions
advance the nonprofit's best interests, nor does it clearly delineate between
acceptable and unacceptable insider transactions. The standards employed
allow well-meaning board members to minimize the seriousness of conflicted transactions and facilitate damaging "groupthink." The fact that
state and federal laws express these standards using radically different terminology sends an unduly complicated and confusing message to board
members.
The problem lies in the reflexive transplantation of corporate law
principles to the nonprofit context. Because fiduciary duty law seeks to
7. Some charities may lack the internal capacity necessary to meet additional regulatory demand.
Julie Goldscheid establishes that three-quarters of all nonprofits have budgets under $500,000, and only
four percent of nonprofits have budgets that are over $10 million dollars per year. Many have staffs that
lack expertise in accounting, technology and human resources, and many lack sufficient technology to
support additional record-keeping demands. Julie Goldsheid, Supporting Accountability: Assessing the
Costs of Regulation, 9 N.Y. CiTY L. REv. 321, 323, 325-327 (2006). As Goldscheid notes, there is a
public perception that nonprofits are acting irresponsibly or worse when the dedicate resources to
administration instead of to mission. Id. at 324-27 (discussing her role, as former General Counsel for
Safe Horizons, in coordinating the New York response to the September 11, 2001, disaster, and in
particular how the nonprofit sector's lack of infrastructure hampered the ability to quickly distributed
funds in comparison to the resources possessed by the for-profit sector). In addition, smaller nonprofits
tend to receive a greater proportion of their assets from restricted corporate and foundation grants that
cannot be applied towards administrative support. Id. at 323.
Those nonprofits that are able to comply may find themselves at a disadvantage in the market
for donor dollars, because the costs of compliance increases resources devoted to overhead and away
from mission (the severity of this problem correlates with the size of the nonprofit-the smaller the
budget, the greater the percentage of charitable assets applied to administration). Professor Dana
Brakeman Reiser therefore argues that a rational nonprofit fiduciary might determine that the costs of
compliance outweigh the prospect of enforcement. Dana Brakman Reiser, There Ought To Be A Law:
The Disclosure Focus of Recent Legislative Proposalsfor Nonprofit Reform, 80 CHi.-KENT. L. REv.
559, 585-86 (2005). In addition, she points out that many of the new proposed regulations duplicate
already existing requirements, which have not had much impact on board behavior. Id. at 583-584. See
also Goldschied, supra note 7, at 321 ("[R]egulations no doubt are essential in ensuring that nonprofits
meet their missions and provide appropriate oversight, accountability, and transparency. However,
some of the proposed regulations would impose additional obligations without substantially advancing
those goals.").
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align the incentives of principal and agent, fiduciary duty law must be context-specific. But there are critical differences between for-profit and nonprofit corporations that make corporate law a very poor tool for minimizing
agency costs in the nonprofit sector.
The most obvious difference between for-profit and nonprofit corporations is that nonprofits lack a principal with the financial incentive and
legal ability to sue to enforce fiduciary duties. For various reasons, state
attorneys general and the Internal Revenue Service rarely bring enforcement actions. There are few market forces that exert pressure on nonprofit
fiduciaries to minimize agency costs. Thus, nonprofit boards are generally
left to police themselves. Moreover, those boards are less equipped to perform the policing function. Nonprofit directors are generally overcommitted volunteers with limited time to devote to governance issues.
When nonprofit corporations function effectively-as a great many of them
do-it is because the directors, or the most influential among them, have
internalized fiduciary duties as social norms.
Thus, the law governing conflicted transactions in the nonprofit context should compensate for the lack of monitoring and board members' lack
of time to devote to governing., It should seek to implement (where absent)
and support (where existing) the social norm of subordination of selfinterest in favor of the nonprofit's best interests (also known as "the nondistribution constraint"). The law's expressive function should be harnessed to clearly direct boards about how to handle conflicted transactions.
Here, there is much to be learned from trust law. Trust law bars transactions between a trustee and the trust unless the trustee, after full disclosure, obtains advance approval of the trust beneficiaries or a court. This
clear rule compensates for beneficiaries' poor monitoring abilities and for
the lack of market pressures that align trustees' and beneficiaries' interests.
The rule, phrased as a prohibition with a procedural safe harbor, also bolsters social norms against self-dealing. When fiduciaries function as a
group, the rule has the added benefit of countering the pervasive problem
of "groupthink," which occurs when fiduciaries' cognitive limitations combine with a desire for approval of other group members to blind fiduciaries
to conflicts and the dangers they present.
Yet policy makers have largely ignored the lessons of trust law, and
continue to adopt corporate law standards, most recently in the newest Revision of the Model Nonprofit Code. The reflexive adoption of corporate

20101

HELPING NONPROFITS POLICE THEMSELVES

law ignores critical differences between the for-profit and nonprofit sectors
and has thus created a largely ineffective body of law. 8
State and federal law should be rewritten to give clear guidance to
nonprofits about how to handle relationships with board members. State
and federal law addressing conflicted transactions should be harmonized to
employ the same rules and terminology, and the law governing conflicted
transactions should take the form of clear rules instead of standards. Taking
a page from trust law, those rules should requireboard members to approve
transactions with board members in advance. And because there is no one
with an adverse financial interest in a position to approve the transaction
(in contrast to the trust context), the board should be required to substantiate that the transaction is a better deal than what could be obtained on the
market. To give this requirement the element of "ruleness," we might pick
an arbitrary target: perhaps twenty percent below market value. Clear rules
threatening legal liability for failure to determine in advance that a conflicted transaction is in the nonprofit's best interest would reinforce social
norms against self-dealing.
I. FIDUCIARY DUTY LAW MUST BE CONTEXT-SPECIFIC

A. Corporatevs. Trust Law
The objective of fiduciary duty law is to minimize the agency costs
that occur when the interests of the agent and principal diverge. 9 For this
reason, fiduciary duty law should be context-specific: the substance of
8. There has been some progress on the tax front; the intermediate sanctions "rebuttable presumption" standard is a welcome move toward "ruleness," and anecdotal evidence suggests that it has
influenced board behavior. The recently revised form 990, which requires nonprofits to explicitly list all
transactions with board members, sends a message to boards that these transactions must be justified.
These moves, though helpful, are inadequate to deal with the problems that conflicts of interest present.
9. Frank H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE
LAW 90-93 (1991); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contractand FiduciaryDuty, 36 J. L. &
ECON. 425, 426-27 (1993). Jensen and Meckling explained how fiduciary relationships present the
potential for agency costs:
If both parties to the [agency] relationship are utility maximizers there is good reason to believe that the agent will not always act in the best interests of the principal. The principalcan
limit divergences from his interest by establishing appropriate incentives for the agent and by
incurring monitoring costs designed to limit the aberrant activities of the agent. In addition in
some situations it will pay the agent to expend resources (bonding costs) to guarantee that he
will not take certain actions which would harm the principal or to ensure that the principal
will become compensated if he does take such actions. However, it is generally impossible for
the principal or the agent at zero cost to ensure that the agent will make optimal decisions
from the principal's viewpoint.
Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: ManagerialBehavior,Agency Costs and Ownership Structure,
3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976). See also EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 9, at 8-11; 91-93;
Easterbrook & Fischel, Contract and FiduciaryDuty, supra note 9, at 426; Melvin Aron Eisneberg, The
Structure of CorporationLaw, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1461, 1471, n.46 (1989).

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol 85:2

fiduciary duty law depends upon the objectives of the fiduciary relationship, and the degree to which other forces, such as markets and social
norms, help align the incentives of principal and fiduciary.
In trust law, fiduciaries are held to a high standard. For centuries, trust
law has stubbornly insisted that when a trustee profits from engaging in a
conflicted transaction with the trust, the beneficiary may void the transaction unless the trustee obtained prior approval after full disclosure.' 0 The
trustee is held per se liable simply upon a beneficiary's showing that the
trustee had a personal interest in the transaction (the "no further inquiry"
rule), even if the self-interested transaction caused the trust no damage. 11
The trustee must disgorge all profits realized as a result of the transaction
and return them to the trust.
Consider an example: X is the trustee of a testamentary trust. X is also
an accountant. X, as trustee, hires his own accounting firm to prepare tax
returns and other tax-related documents on behalf of the trust. He fails to
ask the trust beneficiaries or a court for permission to do so. He charges the
trust his usual hourly fee each time he performs the work. If the trust's
beneficiaries then discover that the trustee has hired himself, they have two
options. If the beneficiaries believe that the deal is a good one for the trust,
they can "ratify" the transaction by allowing the relationship to continue
unfettered. If they believe that the arrangement does not advance their interests, they can sue the trustee for breach of the duty of loyalty. If they
sue, they will not be required to prove damages; they will prevail simply by
establishing that the trustee was on both sides of the transaction. 12 That the
trustee may have charged fees that were commensurate with "fair market
value" is not a defense to his breach of duty. 13 The court has discretion to
10. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 cmt. a (2007) ("[The d]uty of loyalty is, for
trustees, particularly strict even by comparison to the standards of other fiduciary relationships.").
11. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 cmt. b (2007) ("[Under the no further inquiry
rule] it is immaterial that the trustee may be able to show that the action in question was taken in good
faith, that the terms of the transaction were fair, and that no profit resulted to the trustee.").
12. See id. ("[T]he trustee commits a breach of trust by purchasing trust property, even as the
highest bidder at a public auction."). The previous Restatement suggests that a trustee should obtain
court approval for the purchase of trust property, and that a court should grant that approval only when
the purchase is in the beneficiary's best interests:
Purchase by trustee with approval of court. The trustee can properly purchase trust property
for himself with the approval of the court. The court will permit a trustee to purchase trust
property only if in its opinion such purchase is for the best interest of the beneficiary. Ordinarily the court will not permit a trustee to purchase trust property if there are other available
purchasers willing to pay the same price that the trustee is willing to pay.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170 cmt. f (1959).
13. See, e.g., Marshall v. Carson, 38 N.J. Eq. 250 (N.J. 1884) (finding that trustee who purchased
land from the trust breached duty of loyalty because "there is an inherent conflict of interest in the idea
that a purchaser wants to pay the lowest possible price for land, while a trustee wants to sell the land for
the best possible price"); Staats v. Bergen, 17 N.J. Eq. 554, 559 (N.J. 1867) (finding trustee liable for
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impose a wide variety of sanctions, such as removing the trustee or requiring him to disgorge fees to the trust.
Why does the law punish the trustee for failing to obtain advance approval for self-dealing? It does so to compensate for the beneficiaries' difficulties in monitoring the trustee's performance, 14 their inability to
diversify or exit, 15 and the absence of market pressures that might induce
the trustee to put the beneficiaries' interests first. 16 The trust rule forces exante disclosure of conflicts, requires the trustee to justify his proposal, and
sends the trustee the strong message that self-dealing is legitimate only
when the proposed transaction is superior to alternatives available in the
marketplace. 17 The rule works to protect beneficiaries who have no sufficient means of protecting themselves.
In taking this approach, trust law's advance approval requirement
supports trust settlors' objectives. A trustee's promise to subordinate its
interests to those of the beneficiaries reassures the settlor that her loved
ones will be well cared for after her death.
In contrast, corporate fiduciary duty law is more relaxed. Conflicted
transactions that are "fair" are not voidable or the basis for finding breach
of fiduciary duty, even if the transaction was not first approved by disinterested board members (although prior approval after full disclosure by a
breach of the duty of loyalty for purchasing trust property at a foreclosure sale because "the interest of
the [trustee] was directly antagonistic to the that of the complainant. A low price was the gain of the
defendant, but it was, in the same ratio, a loss to the complainant").
14. Beneficiaries are in a poor position to monitor the trustee's behavior. Often, the reason the
beneficiary received the gift in trust, as opposed to outright with no strings attached, is because the
settlor had doubts about the beneficiary's financial sophistication. Beneficiaries who are minors, incapacitated, or who lack financial sophistication will be unable to determine whether a trustee is behaving
opportunistically. Because of this imbalance of capacity and information, beneficiaries are likely to
place substantial trust in the trustee. The trustee's advertised reputation of trustworthiness encourages
beneficiaries' reliance on its judgment. Or, if the trustee is an individual, chosen by the settlor for her
honesty, competence and knowledge of family relationships, the beneficiary trusts that the trustee will
continue to act consistently with past behavior. In either case, the beneficiary is predisposed to believe
that the trustee acts at all times in the beneficiaries' best interests. Melanie B. Leslie, Trusting Trustees:
FiduciaryDuties and the Limits of Default Rules, 94 GEO. L.J. 67, 84 (2005).
15. Sitkoffnotes that aftermarkets for beneficiaries' interests are weak; moreover, in many trusts,
spendthrift clauses prevent beneficiaries from alienating their interest even involuntarily. Robert H.
Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 621, 675-76 (2004).
16. Almost none of the market forces that pressure corporate fiduciaries to forgo opportunistic
behavior are at play in the trust context. There is no "share price" or secondary information market that
informs other potential customers of a trust term that reduces fiduciary duties or communicates trustees'
opportunistic behavior to potential customers. Even if a particular beneficiary discovers that her trustee
is performing poorly, she will be unlikely to communicate this to the trustee's other clients, of whom
she is unaware. See Leslie, Trusting Trustees, supra note 14, at 82.
17. As two commentators have noted, "[t]o overcome difficulties in proof, the law infers disloyalty from its appearance, presuming that a fiduciary will appropriate the principal's asset when it is in
her self-interest to do so." Robert Cooter and Bradley J. Friedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its
Economic Characterand Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1055 (1991).
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majority of disinterested board members creates a presumption that the
transaction was a "fair" one). Prominent corporate scholars justify corporate law's more lenient approach by noting that shareholders are more riskpreferring than trust beneficiaries are. A rule making transactions more
costly might make corporate fiduciaries more risk-averse. In addition, these
scholars assert that higher thresholds for liability are unlikely to lead to
breaches of fiduciary duties because market forces pressure corporate directors to take decisionmaking seriously and to avoid conflicts that are not
in the corporation's best interests. 18 The threat of a takeover of corporate
control, the need to succeed in product markets, and the job market provide
additional incentives for managers to perform in shareholders' best interests. A well-developed information market helps shareholders monitor
management's performance: if shareholders learn of managements' opportunistic behavior they will exit, causing stock prices to fall, 19 and reputational damage may result. Moreover, damage from breach of fiduciary duty
will be less drastic in the corporate context, because shareholders have the
ability to diversify against risk and to exit.
B. The Nonprofit Corporation:No Monitors, No Markets
The central dilemma for nonprofit law is that nonprofit fiduciaries are
not accountable to a principal. 20 Although state and federal governments
18. Corporate scholars argue that the market creates significant pressures that minimize agency
costs regardless of whether management is bound by fiduciary duties. Managers' compensation might
be linked to performance. The threat of a takeover of corporate control, the need to succeed in product
markets, and the job market provide additional incentives for managers to perform in shareholders' best
interests. Moreover, a well developed information market helps shareholders monitor management's
performance. If shareholders learn of managements' opportunistic behavior they will exit, causing stock
prices to fall. Thus, although market forces may be inadequate to curb one-shot breaches of the "take
the money and run" sort, for the most part fiduciaries will tend to minimize agency costs even if the
corporate charter does not require them to do so. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL,
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supranote 9, at 91-92.
As James J. Fishman states:
Perhaps the most important constraint on directors of business corporations is market regulation. The securities, consumer, and occupational markets serve to place deterrents on directors' and management's behavior. Thus, if a director has been remiss, or management has
performed poorly, the market price for the corporation's securities will drop as investors
move onto other companies. The corporation may have difficulty raising capital. Job prospects and compensation of senior management will be adversely affected. Thus market constraints act to externally enforce fiduciary limits.
James J. Fishman, Standardsof Conductfor Directors of Nonprofit Corporations,7 PACE L. REV. 389,
408 (1987).
19. EASTERBROOK AND FISCHEL, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supranote 9, at 96-97.

20. See Susan N. Gary, Regulating the Management of Charities: Trust Law, CorporateLaw, and
Tax Law, 21 U. HAW. L. REV. 593, 616 (1999) ("Any person served by the entity has an interest in
seeing that it is run properly, but no one person is likely to have the incentive, the ability, or the information necessary to monitor the charity. Further, beneficiaries are unlikely to have standing to enforce
their rights as beneficiaries."); See also Evelyn Brody, Agents Without Principals: The Economic
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have authority to monitor conflicted transactions, enforcement efforts range
from minimal to nonexistent. 2 1 There are a few reasons for this, not all of
them bad. Government agencies have limited resources, and may not wish
to spend those resources targeting well-intentioned volunteer board members. An announcement that a nonprofit is the target of an investigation can
immediately cripple the nonprofit by drying up the flow of donations and
grants. If the nonprofit is providing community benefits, a government
agency could take the view that reforming corporate practices under the
radar would be benefit the community more than crippling the nonprofit
22
would.
The nonprofit corporation is also free from the market pressures faced
by its for-profit counterparts. 23 The only significant market pressure that a
charity may face-though it can be quite significant--comes from the need
to attract capital. 24 Donors and government agencies may require various
Convergence of the Nonprofit and For-ProfitOrganizationalForms, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 457, 465
(1996).
21. State attorneys general, representing the public, are the principal monitors of nonprofits, and in
most states, the pressure they bring to bear is minimal. Only a small minority of states has charitable
enforcement bureaus; for those Attorneys General, charitable monitoring competes for resources with
all the other things the AG must do. In the states that do have separate bureaus, funding is limited.
When determining how to apply limited resources, attorneys generals face competing demands. Reiser,
supra note 7, at 598-99 (2005); Evelyn Brody, Whose Public? Parochialismand Paternalism in State
Charity Law Enforcement, 79 IND. L. J. 937, 939, 947, 951 (2004); Gary, supra note 20, at 623 (1999)
(noting that even in those states where the Attorney General's office has an active enforcement division,
most enforcement efforts occur in response to complaints by whistleblowers or the press).
22. Often, an attorney general would prefer to do something other than pursue litigation against a
legitimate charity. When the questionable activity appears to fall short of a major breach of duty, attorneys general often work with the charity to reform it rather than resort to litigation. See Brody, Whose
Public?,supra note 21, at 948; James J. Fishman, Improving CharitableAccountability, 62 MD. L. REV.
218, 268 (2003).
23. Melanie B. Leslie, The Wisdom of Crowds? Groupthink and Nonprofit Governance, 52 FLA.
L. REV. (forthcoming Dec. 2010. The market for donations creates some pressure, sometimes significant. Sources of capital include donations from members of the public, corporate and foundation grants,
and government support. In a few settings the market for grants may discipline not-for-profit fiduciaries. Competition for corporate and private foundation grants is significant, and these entities often
require significant financial disclosure as a condition for repeat giving. These funders often pay close
attention to the charity's effectiveness in accomplishing its mission. In New York City, for example,
there are scores of small charities that receive almost all of their funding from the city government. The
greater the percentage of government and large foundation grants, the more effective the monitoring.
The Urban Institute's Study shows that the level of a nonprofit's reliance on government funding is
positively associated with having an outside audit, a separate audit committee, a conflict-of-interest
policy, and a whistleblower policy. OSTROWER, supra note 6, at 6.
24. Leslie, supra note 23. Sources of capital include donations from members of the public,
corporate and foundation grants, and government support. In a few settings the market for grants may
discipline not-for-profit fiduciaries. Competition for corporate and private foundation grants is significant, and these entities often require significant financial disclosure as a condition for repeat giving.
These funders often pay close attention to the charity's effectiveness in accomplishing its mission. In
New York City, for example, there are scores of small charities that receive almost all of their funding
from the city government. The greater the percentage of government and large foundation grants, the
more effective the monitoring. The Urban Institute's Study shows that the level of a nonprofit's reliance
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degrees of disclosure or accountability as a condition for repeat giving,
which may exert some pressure on the nonprofit to refrain from selfdealing that does not advance the charities' best interests. But funders do
not have standing to sue for breach of fiduciary duty. 25 Moreover, because
most charities rely on a diverse array of sources for funding, the pressure is
insufficient to discipline boards who are predisposed to contract with board
members. Thus, it is up to boards of directors to police themselves - to
effectuate the intentions of charitable donors by ensuring that charitable
assets go towards the charity's mission and not into the pockets of insiders.
Finally, there is no need to encourage risk-taking by allowing selfdealing in the nonprofit sector. The non-distribution constraint is the essential feature of the nonprofit; it is the board's implicit promise not to selfdeal that creates the incentive to give by promising donors that donations
26
will be applied--directly or indirectly-towards the charity's mission.
Those who donate to nonprofits may, of course, support other types of risktaking, such as innovative programming, but those types of risk do not
necessarily require transactions with board members. Thus, we can assume
that donors would want to authorize transactions with board members only
when those transactions clearly advance the nonprofit's charitable objectives.
II. CORPORATE LAW STANDARDS FAIL TO MINIMIZE AGENCY COSTS IN
THE NONPROFIT SECTOR

As currently structured, the law is an ineffective mechanism for deterring harmful conflicted transactions. When nonprofit corporations function
effectively-and a great many of them do-it is because the most vocal
directors have internalized fiduciary duties, such as the non-distribution
constraint, as social norms. For example, Ezra Merkin, the Yeshiva University trustee, was also a member of the investment committee of the UJA
Federation. But the UJA Federation's board had adopted two rules that
stopped it from investing endowment funds with Merkin. First, the organization's Ethical Guidelines and Practices prohibited directors from manag-

on government funding is positively associated with having an outside audit, a separate audit committee, a conflict-of-interest policy, and a whistleblower policy. OSTROWER, supra note 6, at 6.
25. See Gary, supra note 20, at 616. In a revolutionary move, the recently drafted Uniform Trust
Code purports to grant standing to settlors of charitable trusts. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 409 (2005), available at http://www.law.upenn.edulblUarchiveslulc/utal2005final.pdf (last visited Mar. 2, 2010). It is
unclear whether this provision will have much impact on nonprofit governance, since most donors fail
to make donations in charitable trust form.
26. See Henry Hansmann, The Role of the Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.I. 835, 877, 896
(1980).

20101

HELPING NONPROFITS POLICE THEMSELVES

ing the organization's funds. 27Second, the investment committee would not
engage any financial services professional without first conducting due
diligence, including obtaining an understanding of the professional's investment strategy. 28 No law required the Federation to adopt these policies.
The essence of the fiduciary arrangement is the fiduciary's promise to
subordinate self-interest in favor of the nonprofit's best interests. When
fiduciaries have internalized this promise as a social norm, they engage in
informed decisionmaking and refrain from approving questionable conflicted transactions because "it is the right thing to do."' 29 But when dominant directors have not internalized those norms, neither law nor markets
play a meaningful role in preventing self-interested behavior.
As currently structured, state fiduciary duty law does nothing to plant
or support fiduciary norms in environments where fiduciaries have failed to
internalize them. Most states have adopted the fiduciary duty of loyalty
standards applicable to for-profit corporations. 30 Recent scandals such as
those at Enron, WorldCom, and Tyco cast doubt on the effectiveness of
corporate fiduciary duty standards to align the interests of board members
and corporations even in the for-profit context. Most state law provides that
conflicted transactions are not void, or the basis for imposing personal liability, if they are "fair" to the corporation. The board can obtain the presumption of fairness if it obtains the approval of a majority of the
disinterested board members in advance, after full disclosure.
The Internal Revenue Code, which also polices conflicted transactions, is equally ineffective in minimizing self-dealing. The Code, like

27. The UJA Federation's Ethical Guidelines and Practices provide that "No member of the
Investment Committee shall manage, participate in any manager selected to manage, or have a material
ownership interest in an UJA-Federation fund." Ethical Guidelines and Practices of United Jewish
Inc.
§ C. 1,
of
New
York,
Jewish
Philanthropies
Appeal-Federation
of
http://www.ujafedny.org/assets/documents/PDF/bottom-nav/Policies/ETHICAL-GUIDELNES11.1.09-CURRENT-Website.pdf (November 2009).
28. Asher Meir, Charities, Financial Institutions and the Public Trust, Dec. 18, 2008,
http://www.besr.org/Article.aspx?ArticlelD=590 (Dec. 18, 2008).
29. Melvin Eisenberg draws on the work of Robert Cooter and economist Kaushik Basu to posit
that fiduciary duties are more than simply legal rules. Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 1258-1263. They are
"obligational norms"; that is, norms of behavior that are sufficiently ingrained in the culture that violation of the norm will incite self-censure or the judgment of others. Id. at 1257. Eisenberg argues that
many obligational norms are internalized. Id. at 1257-58. Internalized norms comprise an aspect of
individual character, and individuals will honor it reflexively, even if doing so causes them to forgo
material gain. Id. at 1258-60.
30. The 1988 version of the Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act provides that a conflict of
interest transaction is not void or the basis for imposing liability if it is either (a) fair to the corporation,
or (b) was approved by a majority of the disinterested directors, or a committee of the board, after full
disclosure, and the voting board members "in good faith reasonably believed" that the transaction was
fair. REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.31 (1988) (adopted in full or in part by twenty-three
states).
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many state laws on the subject, is comprised of fuzzy standards that do
little to plant or support fiduciary duties as social norms. 3 1 Moreover, the
Code exacerbates the "fuzziness" problem by adopting terminology different than that used in state law. Although Treasury regulations provide that
nonprofits can obtain a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness if the
transaction is approved in advance, 32 at the culmination of a thorough decisionmaking process, this safe harbor provision is not part of the blackletter
law, and thus undermines its expressive force.
Fuzzy standards fail to correct directors' cognitive limitations, such as
confirmation bias and an inflated view of their own fairness and objectivity.33 Cognitive limitations facilitate destructive "groupthink," which can

31. The Internal Revenue Code contains three different doctrines addressing board transactions
with interested directors, articulated in terms equally as fuzzy as state law. First, the code directs that
the charities must abstain from conferring more than an incidental private benefit on individuals other
than insiders. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(l)(ii) (2009). The code also
prevents insiders from obtaining private inurement. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2) (2009). Finally, the IRS may sanction insiders who receive an "excess benefit"
from transacting with the board and managers who approve the excess benefit transaction. I.R.C.
§ 4958-1(b)-(c)(1) (2006) (imposing penalties on "disqualified persons" who engage in "excess benefit" transactions, and the managers who approve them, and defining "excess benefit transaction" as "any
transaction in which an economic benefit is provided by an applicable tax-exempt organization directly
or indirectly to or for the use of any disqualified person if the value of the economic benefit provided
exceeds the value of the consideration (including the performance of services) received for providing
such benefit").
32. Under treasury regulations, advance approval by a committee confers the presumption that the
transaction does not confer an excess benefit on an insider, provided that the committee is made up
entirely of independent directors. Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(a)(1)-(3) (2009).
33. Individuals have cognitive limitations that can impede rational and efficient decision making,
such as deficits in memory and computation skills, limits on the amount of information they can process, or overestimating their own judgment or abilities. Individual cognitive limitations can also facilitate
groupthink. For example, when faced with complicated issues, people exhibit "confirmation bias." See
generally Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2
REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175 (1998). People will seek out information that confirms their beliefs, interpret
neutral information as confirming their beliefs, and will fail to seek out and ignore information that
challenges their instincts. See James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: PsychologicalFoundationsand Legal Implications of CorporateCohesion, 48 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 8891 (1985) (discussing extensive behavioral research studies supporting this point); see also Charles G.
Lord, et al., Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization:The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098, 2099-2102 (1979) (establishing that people tend to interpret ambiguous information to confirm their initial point of view); Antony
Page, Unconscious Bias and the Limits of Director Independence, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 237, 265
(2009). Most people also overestimate their own objectivity and ability to be fair. Most individuals view
themselves as more fair and moral than other people, and this self-conception causes them unconsciously to favor interpretations of reality that confirm that view. See Dolly Chugh et al., Bounded
Ethicality as a PsychologicalBarrierto Recognizing Conflicts of Interest, in CONFLICTS OF INTEREST:
CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS IN BUSINESS, LAW, MEDICINE AND PUBLIC POLICY 75, 84 (Don A.
Moore, et al., eds. 2005). That is, in addition to "bounded rationality," group members suffer from
"bounded ethicality": a limited ability to recognize ethical challenges inherent in a decision involving a
conflict of interest. Id. at 75. See generally, Leslie, supra note 23.
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undermine social norms that facilitate good governance procedures. 34
Groupthink occurs when the desire to win the approval of other group
members-and the fear of social sanction that may attach for challenging
the group's point of view 35-cause directors to place allegiance to fellow
board members ahead of the nonprofit's best interests. 36 Groupthink blinds
directors to conflicts of interest, and may also induce directors to refrain
from adequately monitoring ongoing business relationships with board
members. 37 The phenomenon can create defects in the group decisionmaking process that have been shown to lead to poor decisionmaking: the
group members may fail to express dissent; 38 ask questions or consider the
full range of alternative options; 39 decline to re-examine the decision initially preferred by a majority of group members in light of changing events;
make little effort to obtain information by asking questions or consulting
experts or outsiders with information; 40 and exhibit bias in their reactions
to information, focusing on facts or opinions that confirm the group's initial inclination and ignoring those that do not. 4 1 Finally, groupthink may
lead members to spend too little time exploring how their course of action
42
might later be derailed by opponents, accidents or future occurrences.
34. Irving L. Janis appears to have first coined the term in his book, VICTIMS OF GROUPTH1NK
(1967). As he explained: "I use the term 'groupthink' as a quick and easy way to refer to a mode of
thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when members'
strivings for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action."
Id. at 9.
35. Irving Janis explains the studies:
Whenever a [group] member says something that sounds out of line with the group's norms,
the other members first increase their communication with the deviant. Attempts to influence
the nonconformist member to revise or tone down his dissident ideas continue as long as most
members of the group feel hopeful about talking him into changing his mind. But if they fail
after repeated attempts, the amount of communication they direct toward the deviant decreases markedly. The members begin to exclude him, often quite subtly at first and later
more obviously, in order to restore the unity of the group.... [Experiments show that] the
more cohesive the group and the more relevant the issue to the goals of the group, the greater
is the inclination of the members to reject a nonconformist. Just as the members insulate
themselves from outside critics who threaten to disrupt the unity and esprit de corps of their
group, they take steps, often without being aware of it, to counteract the disruptive influence
of inside critics who are attacking the group's norms.
Id. at 5.
36. Id. at 8-9; CASS R. SUNsTEIN, GOING TO EXTREMES (2009).
37. See Cox & Munsinger, supra note 33, at 105-108.
38. See Samuel N. Fraidin, Duty of CareJurisprudence: ComparingJudicialIntuition and Social
Psychology Research, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1, 50-58 (2004) (considering a number of psychological
studies that establish that group decisions are better when group members express dissent).
39. Studies show that groups that consider multiple alternatives have a greater chance of arriving
at a decision that represents the best course of action. Id. at 42-46.
40. JANIS, supranote 34, at 12; Fraidin, supra note 38, at 42-46.
41. JANIS, supra note 34, at 10. Janis explains that each of these defects may be caused by other
factors, such as fatigue, prejudice, stupidity or ignorance. Id. at 10-11.
42. Id. at 10.
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Nonprofit boards are uniquely vulnerable to groupthink, 4 3 because information asymmetries are more pronounced, 44 market pressures are relatively weak, and board members may view themselves less as monitors and
more as fundraisers and "supporters" of the group's executive director. 4 5 In
some cases, board members may view membership as conferring an entitlement to self-deal, especially when board membership comes at a price.
As Deborah DeMott explains,
[D]irectors' motives and incentives for service on nonprofit boards differ
dramatically from motives and incentives in the for-profit environment..
. . Board members often join because they believe in an organization's
mission and contribute to it with financial donations. They depend heavily on organization management to set the board's agenda and provide
information to the board. Many large nonprofits also have relatively
large boards. Some actors in this environment reportedly believe that directors who make financial contributions have a reciprocal entitlement to
self-deal. Indeed the prospect of self-dealing may entice some 46directors
to serve and to make financial contributions to the organization.
Instructing nonprofit boards that transactions with board members are
fine if they are "fair," or "not excessive" enables board members to convince themselves that most transactions fit this standard. 47 The fiduciary
43. See generally Leslie, supra note 23.
44. Evelyn Brody writes that "Nonprofit directors devote even less time and attention to their
positions. Such affirmative board duties as selecting the chief officer, preparing the budget, and reviewing operations are likely to be carried out haphazardly or by only a few of the board members." Evelyn
Brody, The Limits of Charity Fiduciary Law, 57 MD. L. REV. 1400, 1445-1446 (1998). David Barrett
stresses that, "unlike for-profits, the board of many nonprofits consists of uncompensated volunteers.
These volunteer directors are usually very busy people who hold other full-time jobs and simply do not
have as much time to devote to their duties as most inside directors of for-profits." David W. Barrett, A
Call for More Lenient Director Liability Standards for Small, Charitable Nonprofit Corporations, 71
IND. L.J. 967, 967 (1996).
45. See Leslie, supra note 23. The Urban Institute's Recent Study indicates that boards that focus
board recruiting efforts on friends and acquaintances of current board members did less well with every
aspect of governing except fundraising, where it had no impact. FRANCINE OSTROWER, NONPROFIT
GOVERNANCE IN THE UNITED STATES: FINDINGS ON PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY FROM THE
FIRST NATIONAL REPRESENTATIVE STUDY 16 (2007). The more diverse a board, the less vulnerable it is
to groupthink. Perhaps this is why the percentage of ethnic and minority group members is positively
associated with having an outside audit, a separate audit committee, a conflict of interest policy and a
whistle blower policy. Id. at 6. The percentage of female board members positively correlates with
having conflict of interest and whistleblower policies. Id. at 5.
46. Deborah A . DeMott, Self-Dealing Transactions in Nonprofit Corporations, 59 BROOK. L.
REV. 131, 140-41 (1993).
47. In group experiments, this unconscious bias often causes group members to judge an act that
gives an advantage to one group member as "fair" even when it is not. See Chugh et al., supra note 33,
at 86-88. This tendency blinds group members to the ethical issues implicit in decisions involving a
conflict of interest. In these situations, group members either tend to believe that the conflict will not
affect their judgment, id. at 82, or they entirely fail to perceive the conflict at all. Page, supra note 33, at
259. In fact, instead of appreciating the ethical and legal issues presented by a conflict of interest transaction, group members often view the transaction as an opportunity to reward particular group members
for loyalty to the group. Some group members may even feel obliged to confer such rewards. Chugh et
al., supra note 33, at 76.
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norm is supplanted by an allegiance to the group, with the result that board
members are more likely to authorize transactions that actually siphon assets away from mission and into director's pockets.
III. THE JUSTIFICATIONS ADVANCED FOR APPLYING CORPORATE LAW
STANDARDS TO NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS ARE UNPERSUASIVE.
From time to time in the past few decades, scholars have argued that
conflicted transactions by nonprofit boards should be reviewed under a
standard that is stricter than corporate law provides. 48 Yet these thoughtful
arguments have been ignored by those who craft uniform statutes. The
following sections examine some frequently-invoked justifications for
adopting corporate law, and argue that those justifications lack force.
A. Trust Law is Moving Toward CorporateLaw.
Some argue, in defense of the status quo, that trust law's duty of loy49
alty has lost its vigor, and thus is a poor model for the nonprofit rules.
Indeed, the past two decades have seen banks engage in vigorous and successful lobbying efforts to water down the duty of loyalty. The slow erosion of the Glass-Steagall Act, which culminated in its repeal in 1999,50
induced increasing numbers of institutional trust companies to merge, affiliate with or purchase financial institutions offering investment banking
services. 5 1 As a result, increasing numbers of institutions are entering the
trust market, and increasing numbers of institutional trustees are in a position to obtain additional financial benefits by investing trust assets in related companies. When this happens, the corporation benefits twice,
earning both trustee commissions and other fees, such as those related to
the management and sale of the investment.

48. See DeMott, supra note 46, at 143 (proposing that self-dealing transactions be voidable unless
the transaction's proponents can affirmatively establish its fairness to the corporation at the time of the
transaction); Harvey J. Goldschmid, The Fiduciary Duties of Nonprofit Directors and Officers: Paradoxes, Problems and Proposed Reforms, 23 IOWA J. CORP. L. 631, 650-51 (1998) (arguing that courts
should not apply the business judgment rule when reviewing a board's decision to approve a selfinterested transaction, but should review the transaction for fairness); Henry B. Hansmann, Reforming
Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 497, 569 (1981) (advocating a ban on self-dealing in
the nonprofit context).
49. See ALl Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Organizations, Tentative Draft No. 1 (March 19,
2007), page 1 (justifying the rejection of trust law as a model for nonprofit rules in part because "recent
years have brought a liberalization of the trust rules").
50. 12 U.S.C.A. § 377 (1935), repealedby Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 1, 113 Stat. 1341 (1999).
51. See Joan M. LeGraw & Stacey L. Davidson, Glass-Steagall and the "Subtle Hazards" of
JudicialActivism, 24 NEW ENG. L. REv. 225, 226-28 (1989).
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Banks now view their trust departments as profit centers, and have
sought legislative concessions that allow them to maximize profits by engaging in activities that would violate the centuries-old duty of loyalty.
State legislatures have responded to these lobbying efforts by enacting
statutes that allow banks to engage in particular types of conflicted transactions without threat of liability. To the extent that these statutes represent
an erosion of the trust prohibition against self-dealing without advance
approval, they are unjustifiable, and grounded not on sound policy considerations but on the commercial interests of banks.
B. Nonprofits Function Like For-ProfitCorporations.
In justifying the adoption of corporate rules, some emphasize that
nonprofit corporations bear closer structural and functional similarities to
for-profit corporations than they do to trusts. 52 Trustees, they argue, simply
manage assets. Nonprofit boards run businesses. 53 Moreover, because
many nonprofit directors are often business executives, for-profit and nonprofit rules should be streamlined to avoid confusion.
But focusing on superficial resemblances misses the point. The project
should be to identify and construct rules that will minimize agency costs in
a particular context. The key factors are the roles that markets, law and
social norms play in aligning principal and agent incentives, and the extent
to which the law must compensate for the absence of other monitoring
forces.
The argument in favor of aligning nonprofit and for-profit standards to
avoid confusion for board members who operate in both worlds has some
force in the cases of the largest nonprofits, where board members are likely
to serve on multiple boards of both nonprofits and for-profits. But streamlining is more important when the law is comprised of fuzzy standards that
require study and the advice of counsel to interpret. If nonprofit rules are
simple and clear, the fact that they are different than for-profit rules can be
easily communicated to sophisticated board members.

52. As one court put it, "[T]he modem trend is to apply corporate rather than trust principles in
determining the liability of the directors of charitable corporations, because their functions are virtually
indistinguishable from those of their 'pure' corporate counterparts." Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat'l
Training Sch. for Deaconesses, 381 F. Supp. 1003, 1013 (D.D.C. 1974).
53. See ALl Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Organizations, Tentative Draft No. 1 (March 19,
2007), page 3 (arguing that "many charities today operate enterprises to the management demands of a
complex business, making corporate fiduciary standards appropriate") (on file with author).
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C The Trust Law Duty of Loyalty is Only a Default Law
Another argument offered for rejecting the trust law approach characterizes the "advance approval" rule as an artifact that parties avoid by simply drafting out if it. 54 Thus, the reasoning follows, the advance approval
requirement is a dead rule, rarely invoked by courts. It makes no sense to
extend a moribund rule-one that trust settlors themselves avoid-to the
55
nonprofit context.
But in fact, settlors rarely, if ever, waive the duty of loyalty protections by providing that corporate law will govern trustee's self-dealing
transactions. Instead, waivers are transaction-specific-that is, settlors
typically authorize the trustee to engage in particular transactions that
would otherwise constitute a breach of the duty of loyalty. When a settlor
authorizes a particular conflict-of-interest in advance, she does so with full
information and with the knowledge that authorizing the conflict will best
advance her purposes in creating the trust. For example, she may place
shares of a family-owned business in trust, appoint her son, the CEO of the
company, as trustee, and authorize the trustee to buy and sell the trust's
shares. This waiver of the duty of loyalty allows her necessary flexibility in
managing the family business. Because the trust is funded with the settlor's
money, and because she has full information about the terms of her trust,
trust law allows this exception to the duty of loyalty. The advance approval
requirement comes into play later, after the settlor relinquishes control to
the trustee and entrusts the trustee with the beneficiaries' interests. The rule
does its work to ensure that her wishes are carried out. Thus, the fact that
settlors can authorize specific conflicted transactions is not evidence that
the advance approval rule is dead or undesirable.
D. Trust Law is "Too Restrictive" Because Nonprofits Need to be Able to
Engage in Below-Market Transactionswith Directors.
The primary justification for rejecting trust law's advance approval
rule is that it would bar transactions that compensate for the nonprofit's

54. See Evelyn Brody, Charity Governance: What's Trust Law Got To Do With It?, 80 CHI.KENT. L. REV. 641, 658 (2005) ("[T]he settlor of a charitable trust typically includes provisions in the
instrument that relieve the trustee(s) of legal duties to the maximum extent permitted; this generally
results in a lenient standard like that imposed on corporate directors.").
55. See ALl Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Organizations, ALl Principles of the Law of
Nonprofit Organizations, Tentative Draft No. 1 (March 19, 2007), page 1 (explaining the reporter's
decision to adopt corporate law instead of trust law standards as justified because "well counseled"
settlors often relax the duty of loyalty in the trust document).
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ability to raise capital. 56 Nonprofits aggressively set out to recruit potential
board members who can offer goods and services for discounted prices,
and therefore help the nonprofit devote more resources to mission and less
to overhead. 57 Trust law, the argument goes, would damage the nonprofit
by prohibiting these types of transactions, 58 or increasing the transaction
costs associated with entering them.
First, this argument misunderstands trust law. As explained previously, trust law has never completely prohibited self-dealing. Rather, it has
prohibited self-dealing without advance approval, by the beneficiaries or a
court, after full disclosure. The rule simply compensates for lack of monitoring by forcing early disclosure of conflicts and requiring the fiduciary to
justify its decision to self-deal in advance.
Second, the argument that market value conflicted transactions are
beneficial because they save transaction costs is a nonstarter. The transaction costs saved-pricing the market, finding the best deal for the nonprofit, sanctioning the deal in advance-are the very costs that we want the
board to incur. Eliminating these costs is what leads a board to engagesometimes quite innocently and with the best of intentions-in deals that
waste money or, worse, lead to egregious acts of self-dealing. Groupthink
often blinds directors to the real costs of these transactions, and discourages
them from doing the leg work that might reveal that the transactions are not
quite the good deals that they may at first appear to be.
E. Rules That Have Teeth Deter Board Service
An argument that is regularly made against imposing any rules that
seem to lower the threshold for liability for board members is that competent people will simply decline to serve on nonprofit boards if they fear
they might inadvertently do something that will expose them to embarrassment and liability. I do not wish to minimize the seriousness of the
problem of attracting competent board members. But if board members
could easily access and understand the rules, giving them a clear sense of
56. See Evelyn Brody, InstitutionalDissonancein the Nonprofit Sector, 41 VILL. L. REV. 433, 500
(1996) ("[P]eople often make desirable directors because of their ties to certain businesses and their
ability to obtain certain goods or services for the nonprofit on terms favorable to the nonprofit. Barring
such insider transactions would cost the nonprofit sector dearly."); see also, Susan N. Gary, Regulating
the Management of Charities: Trust Law, CorporateLaw, and Tax Law, 21 U. HAW. L. REV. 593, 635
(1999) (arguing that "[o]btaining help from directors may enable some nonprofits, in particular small,
local nonprofits, to survive. An absolute prohibition on such transactions seems too drastic.").
57. See OSTROWER, supra note 6, at 7.
58. See ALI Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Organizations, Tentative Draft I (March 19,
2007), page 53 (stating that "under trust law, transactions... between the trustee and the trust traditionally have been forbidden").
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what behavior exposes them to liability, the threat of legal exposure might
be less of a hindrance than it currently is.
IV. CONCLUSION

A law tailored to minimize self-dealing in the nonprofit context would
compensate for the current lack of monitoring by forcing disclosure of
conflicts, would ensure prospective donors that their donations would be
dedicated to the nonprofit's mission and not to the personal benefit of
board members, would be simple and easy to understand to ensure that
volunteer and overcommitted board members access it, and would be procedurally oriented, to reassure board members that if they follow the rules
they will be invulnerable to personal liability. Trust law's advance approval
requirement would do a better job of facilitating those objectives than corporate law currently does.
Of course, trust law is not a perfect fit; the advance approval rule
works because it requires the acquiescence of trust beneficiaries, who have
a direct financial interest in the trust, to give approval. The nonprofit corporation lacks a monitor who will be affected financially by a conflicted
transaction. This distinction justifies a flat prohibition on nonprofit transactions with board members. But because this suggestion is politically untenable, I offer an alternative proposal. Prior to engaging in a transaction with
a board member, the transaction must be approved by the Attorney General
or a majority of all disinterested directors. Because these particular directors do not have a direct financial interest in the transaction, there should be
a requirement that the directors establish (and document) that the transaction is superior to one that could be obtained through a market place transaction. To give this requirement the character of "ruleness," it might make
sense to impose an arbitrary bright line rule, such as requiring that the
board establish that the transaction is twenty percent lower than prevailing
market rates.
If the board fails to follow the advance approval procedure, then a
court could impose any penalties or reforms that it finds advisable, including imposing personal liability on board members who participated in or
authorized a self-dealing transaction without board approval. The threat of
liability, however remote, for failing to follow the required procedure
would help compensate for the lack of enforcement efforts by government
actors. This clear directive, backed up by the threat of a sanction, would go
far to support and reinforce social norms against self-dealing.

